The Concept Of Agency Theory Recognizes There Are Fundamental Differences Accounting Essay


An bureau relationship is a contract under which one or more individuals ( the principal ( s ) ) engage another individual ( the agent ) to execute some service on their behalf which involves deputing some determination doing authorization to the agent ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976 ) . If both parties to the association are public-service corporation maximizers and they may hold different purposes and aims, it is inevitable that the agent will non ever move in the best involvements of the principal.

The construct of bureau theory originated from the work of Adolf Augustus Berle and Gardiner Coit Means, who were discoursing the issues of the agent and rule every bit early as 1932. Berle and Means explored the constructs of bureau and their applications toward the development of big corporations. Michael C. Jensen and William Meckling shaped the work of Berle and Means in the context of the risk-sharing research popular in the 1960s and ’70s to develop bureau theory as a formal construct. Jensen and Meckling formed a school of idea reasoning that corporations are structured to minimise the costs of acquiring agents to follow the way and involvements of the principals. ( Renee O’Farrell, 2010 )

The construct of bureau theory recognizes there are cardinal differences in how stockholders, directors, and even bondholders interpret their several relationships to an organisation. While they may portion some common ends and aims, there is the possible for at least some aims to emerge that are focused more on single enrichment than on the wellbeing of the whole ( Kleiman, 2010 ) . For illustration, directors may be more focussed on constructing a repute for themselves, perchance making their ain power bases within the construction of the larger organisations. Stockholders may go more focussed on gaining dividends now and less on the hereafter of the concern. Bondholders may be concerned merely with the undertaking associated with the bond issue, and lose sight of how the overall stableness of the company can hold a negative impact on the return earned from that bond ( Kleiman, 2010 ) .

Contribution of bureau theory to the development of accounting

Current mainstream accounting research is based extensively on economic theoretical accounts of bureau that represent he runing company ( house ) directors “ agent ” and the single investors “ chief ” . This chief agent theoretical account has besides been implicitly adopted in the ordinance of accounting, which focuses on the demands and public assistance of a diverse group of single investors who entrust their wealth to the control of director. ( Bricker, Chandar 1998 )

Accounting plays an of import function as a critical portion of the contracts that define a house. For illustration, imparting agreements between a house and its creditors frequently contain several accounting based compacts. Accounting-based fillip programs are often a constituent of executive compensation programs. Accounting steps are normally used in the public presentation rating of a house ‘s cost and net income centres. ( Bricker, Chandar 1998 )

The construct of Positive Accounting Theory has emerged, in recent old ages, which is based on the theory of bureau. It focuses on the relationships between the assorted persons involved in supplying resources to an organisation and how accounting is used to help in the operation of these relationships. While normative theories tend to urge what should be done. When decision-making authorization is delegated, this can take to some loss of efficiency and consequent costs. For illustration, if the proprietor ( chief ) delegates decision-making authorization to a director ( agent ) it is possible that the director may non work every bit difficult as would the proprietor, given that the director might non portion straight in the consequences of the organisation. Any possible loss of net incomes brought approximately by the director underperforming is considered to be a cost that consequences from the decision-making deputation within this bureau relationship – an bureau cost. The bureau costs that arise as a consequence of deputing decision-making authorization from the proprietor to the director are referred to in Positive Accounting Theory as bureau costs of equity. ( http: // % 20from % 20Chapter % 207 % 20Positive % 20Accounting % 20Theory-d0385ad3b7925717c0b72a06b16de4f4.pdf )

Positive Accounting Theory, as developed by Watts and Zimmerman and others, is based on the cardinal economics-based premise that all persons ‘ action is driven by opportunism and that persons will ever move in an timeserving mode to the extent that the actions will increase their wealth. Impressions of trueness, morality and the similar are non incorporated in the theory ( as they typically are non incorporated in other accounting or economic theories ) . Given an premise that self-interest thrusts all single actions, Positive Accounting Theory predicts that organisations will seek to set in topographic point mechanisms that align the involvements of the directors of the house ( the agents ) with the involvements of the proprietors of the house ( the principals ) . ( http: // % 20from % 20Chapter % 207 % 20Positive % 20Accounting % 20Theory-d0385ad3b7925717c0b72a06b16de4f4.pdf )

Some of these methods of alining involvements will be based on the end product of the accounting system ( such as supplying the director with a portion of the organisation ‘s net incomes ) . Where such accounting based ‘alignment mechanisms ‘ are in topographic point, there will be a demand for fiscal statements to be produced. Directors are predicted to ‘bond ‘ themselves to fix these fiscal statements. This is dearly-won in itself, and in Positive Accounting Theory would be referred to as a ‘bonding cost ‘ . If we assume that directors ( agents ) will be responsible for fixing the fiscal statements, so Positive Accounting Theory besides would foretell that there would be a demand for those statements to be audited or monitored, otherwise agents would, presuming opportunism, seek to exaggerate net incomes, thereby increasing their absolute portion of net incomes. ( http: // % 20from % 20Chapter % 207 % 20Positive % 20Accounting % 20Theory-d0385ad3b7925717c0b72a06b16de4f4.pdf )

Agency Theory and Corporate Government

Persons are by and large taken to be preoccupied with Generally the basic unit of analysis is taken as the ‘individual ‘ who is preoccupied with maximizing or at least fulfilling their public-service corporation ; conceived typically in footings of a tradeoff between work and leisure. It is this blend of false independency and self-interested thrust that creates the jobs within bureau relationships. ( J Roberts, 2004 )

Using this construct to corporate administration, in effect of the separation of ownership and control, it is the stockholder who is taken as the ‘principal ‘ and the job is how the principal can do certain that his ‘agents ‘ – company managers – work for the fulfilment of stockholders involvements instead than their ain. The redresss to this construct of the bureau job within corporate administration involves the credence of certain ‘agency costs ‘ involved either in making incentives/sanctions that will aline executive ego involvement with the involvements of stockholders, or incurred in supervising executive behavior in order to restrain their self-interest. ( J Roberts, 2004 )

As these premises have been read onto corporate administration, and informed its reform in recent decennaries, they have resulted in what are now an about cosmopolitan set of techniques and patterns designed to command the behavior of executives both within the corporation and externally ( Walsh and Seward 1990 ) . Inside the company, boards have basically two agencies to exert control over executives ; they can fire them and they can give them incentives – portion options, long-run inducement programs. For these levers to work, nevertheless, boards must be populated with ‘independent ‘ non-executives who are willing and able to supervise executive public presentation, peculiarly where there are possible struggles of involvement. The growing and development of both the figure of non-executives on boards every bit good as the increased specification of their function and conditions of ‘independence has characterized board reform around the universe. The separation of the function of main executive from that of the non-executive president has been portion of this ; in the linguistic communication of Cadbury it is intended that this ensures that no 1 person has ‘unfettered ‘ powers of determination. The creative activity of audit, wage, and nominations commissions all staffed by independent non-executives, is besides common and ideally ensures both the proper usage of inducements and a high grade of monitoring of executive public presentation and decision-making. To these internal controls are added a scope of external controls. Foremost here has been the focal point on enhanced ‘disclosure ‘ , and the ‘transparency ‘ that this allows, chiefly of fiscal public presentation but late besides of societal and environmental public presentation ( Dissanike 1999, Zadek 2001 ) . The purpose is that the portion market is thereby better informed such that all relevant information is impacted into the share-price ( Fama 1980, Barker 1998 ) . There is besides a market for corporate control ( Cosh et al 1989, Robert 2004 ) that ideally allows for weak direction squads to be displaced by strong squads that will run companies to better consequence for stockholders. In recent old ages at least at a policy degree at that place has besides been concern that stockholders – in the signifier of the big institutional investors – taking on their duties as proprietors ( Myners, ISC 2002, Simpson and Charkham, Robert 2004 ) through exerting proper examination and influence both publically and through their private contacts with investors ( Roberts et al 2003, Robert 2004 ) .

Covering with Agency Problems – Reward strategies

There are two polar places for covering with shareholder-manager bureau struggles. At one extreme, the house ‘s directors are compensated wholly on the footing of stock monetary value alterations. In this instance, bureau costs will be low because directors have great inducements to maximise stockholder wealth ( Eugene and Jensen, 1985 ) . It would be highly hard, nevertheless, to engage gifted directors under these contractual footings because the house ‘s net incomes would be affected by economic events that are non under managerial control. At the other extreme, shareholders could supervise every managerial action, but this would be highly dearly-won and inefficient. The optimum solution lies between the extremes, where executive compensation is tied to public presentation, but some monitoring is besides undertaken. In add-on to monitoring, the undermentioned mechanisms encourage directors to move in stockholders ‘ involvements:

performance-based inducement programs

direct intercession by stockholders

the menace of firing

the menace of coup d’etat

Most publically traded houses now employ public presentation portions, which are portions of stock given to executives on the footing of public presentations as defined by fiscal steps such as net incomes per portion, return on assets, return on equity, and stock monetary value alterations. If corporate public presentation is above the public presentation marks, the house ‘s directors earn more portions. If public presentation is below the mark, nevertheless, they receive less than 100 per centum of the portions. Incentive-based compensation programs, such as public presentation portions, are designed to fulfill two aims. First, they offer executives inducements to take actions that will heighten stockholder wealth. Second, these programs help companies pull and retain directors who have the assurance to put on the line their fiscal hereafter on their ain abilities-which should take to better public presentation wealth ( Eugene and Jensen, 1985 ) .

An increasing per centum of common stock in corporate America is owned by institutional investors such as insurance companies, pension financess, and common financess ( Kleiman, 2010 ) . The institutional money directors have the clout, if they choose, to exercise considerable influence over a house ‘s operations. Institutional investors can act upon a house ‘s directors in two primary ways. First, they can run into with a house ‘s direction and offer suggestions sing the house ‘s operations. Second, institutional stockholders can patronize a proposal to be voted on at the one-year shareholders ‘ meeting, even if the proposal is opposed by direction. Although such shareholder-sponsored proposals are nonbinding and affect issues outside daily operations, the consequences of these ballots clearly influence direction sentiment.

In the yesteryear, the likeliness of a big company ‘s direction being ousted by its shareholders was so distant that it posed small menace. This was true because the ownership of most houses was so widely distributed, and direction ‘s control over the vote mechanism so strong, that it was about impossible for heretical shareholders to obtain the necessary ballots required to take the directors ( Kleiman, 2010 ) . In recent old ages, nevertheless, the main executive officers at American Express Co. , General Motors Corp. , IBM, and Kmart have all resigned in the thick of institutional resistance and guess that their goings were associated with their companies ‘ hapless runing public presentation.

Hostile coup d’etats, which occur when direction does non wish to sell the house, are most likely to develop when a house ‘s stock is undervalued comparative to its possible because of unequal direction ( Chen et al, 2006 ) . In a hostile coup d’etat, the senior directors of the acquired house are typically dismissed, and those who are retained lose the independency they had prior to the acquisition. The menace of a hostile coup d’etat subjects managerial behaviour and induces directors to try to maximise stockholder value ( Kleiman, 2010 ) .

In the best instance scenario, bureau cost is managed in such a manner that the involvements of all parties is protected, and the organisation is able to boom as a consequence ( Tatum, 2010 ) . Even if the assorted types of costs or disbursals involved are identified, if the actions pursued to make a balanced divergency of control are non effectual, the organisation is extremely likely to endure, sometimes to the point of complete failure. When this occurs, the collective and personal ends and aims of directors, stockholders, and bondholders are all undermined to some extent, ensuing in losingss for everyone concerned ( Tatum, 2010 ) .