Gulf Refinery Fire

In the early hours of August 17, 1975, a tragic disaster occurred on the Gulf Oil refinery in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This horrific disaster took the lives of eight firefighters, and potentially could have taken more lives if it wasn’t for the help of many surrounding fire stations. The cause of the fire was the overfilling of Tank 231. While no crude oil escaped from the tank as a result of being overfilled, large quantities of hydrocarbon vapors were trapped above the surface of the tank’s crude oil. As the quantity of crude oil increased, these hydrocarbon vapors were forced out of the tank’s vents and into the area of the No. Boiler House where the initial flash occurred.

The overfilling of the tank resulted from a failure of the tanker’s personnel to properly monitor the quantity of crude oil being pumped to the tank. This whole disaster could have been avoided by just double checking the amount of crude oil in Tank 231. At 12:45 a. m. on the morning of Sunday, August 17, 1975, the tanker “M/T Afran Neptune,” tied up at a Gulf Refinery dock, began pumping reconstituted Venezuelan crude oil with additional 5 percent naphtha into Gulf Refinery Tank No. 31. Tank No. 231, built in 1929, of riveted seam construction, had a capacity of 75,000 barrels and had recently been renovated with an internal floating roof. Within the refinery, the tank was located at Avenue “Y” and 4th Street. Located just west of Tank No. 231 was Boiler House No. 4, the site of a four-alarm fire on April 22, 1967. A brick chimney arose from Boiler House No. 4 and this stack was a familiar sight to westbound motorists on the Penrose Avenue Bridge as the word “GULF” was painted in large, white letters.

Hydrocarbon vapors, emanating from Tank 231, accumulated in the area of the boiler house and were ignited by an unknown ignition source. A flame front followed the vapors back to Tank 231 causing fire at the tank’s vents and an explosion within the outer shell of the stack. These events began to unfold at 5:57 a. m. Shortly thereafter, a second explosion occurred within Tank 231. Burning petroleum spilled from the tank’s vents into a diked area surrounding the tank. Within the diked area a second tank, No. 114, just north of Tank 231, containing No. 6 grade fuel oil, also ignited as pipelines within the diked area began to fail.

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The initial explosion also damaged the pipe manifold outside of the dike wall and petroleum pouring out under pressure ignited. At 6:04 a. m. , upon receiving the report of fire from the Gulf Refinery, the Philadelphia Fire Department transmitted the refinery’s fire alarm box: Box 5988, Penrose and Lanier Avenues. Upon leaving their station, Engine 60 could see fire and smoke conditions at a distance, and before arriving at the refinery, Engine 60 ordered the second alarm at 6:09 a. m. First arriving companies had large clouds of heavy black smoke emanating from Tank No. 31, fire on top of Tank No. 114, and fire showing from the 150-foot stack at Boiler House No. 4. The third and fourth alarms were ordered in quick succession by Battalion Chief 1, Arthur Foley, at 6:11 a. m. and 6:14 a. m. Acting Assistant Fire Chief Dalmon Edmunds ordered the fifth alarm at 6:34 a. m. The sixth alarm was ordered by Fire Commissioner Joseph Rizzo at 6:52 a. m. Over the next several hours, firefighters utilized deluge guns and master streams to cool down surrounding exposures, and applied foam directly to the burning tanks and piping in an effort to extinguish the fire.

By 8:44 a. m. it appeared that the fire was well contained and the situation sufficiently stabilized to declare the fire under control. As the firefighting operation progressed, it became apparent that the refinery’s sewerage system was not up to the task of properly draining the foam, water and petroleum-naphtha product mixture that was accumulating on the ground along Avenue “Y,” between 4th Street and 5th Street to the east, running in front of the refinery’s administration building.

These drainage problems were further exacerbated by a decision by refinery personnel to shutoff drainage pumps. Three members were attending to the apparatus and wading in the foam-water-petroleum mixture which was accumulating on the ground. Commissioner Rizzo and Gulf Refinery manager Jack Burk were on an overhead catwalk nearby observing the fire fighting operation. Without warning the accumulating liquid surrounding Engine 133 ignited, immediately trapping the three firefighters working at Engine 133.

Instinctively and without hesitation other nearby firefighters dove into the burning liquid to rescue their comrades, not aware of the danger to themselves. Five more firefighters would be consumed by the advancing fire. The flames just engulfed them," said Commissioner Joseph Rizzo, describing how he escaped the first of dozens of explosions but looked back to see three of his men sealed in flames. “They were trying to get under the foam, but to no avail," he said. "They were human torches. " The fire quickly spread eastward along Avenue “Y” towards 5th Street.

Viewing the unfolding horror before him, Commissioner Rizzo ordered two more alarms, five additional rescue squads, and the recall of all companies which had previously been released from the fire grounds throughout the day. On these orders the fire alarm room transmitted the seventh and eighth alarms. As the fire had been placed under control nearly eight hours earlier, firefighters in stations across the city knew that the unthinkable had occurred as these additional alarms were struck. At 4:46 p. m.

Commissioner Rizzo ordered the ninth alarm and notification of Philadelphia Managing Director Hillel Levinson as a major disaster was now unfolding at the Gulf Refinery. As the fire swept rapidly eastward along 5th Street, Philadelphia’s foam pumpers, Engines 160 and 133, and the Gulf Refinery foam pumper, were rapidly destroyed in the fire’s advance. At 5th Street, where Engines 16 and 40 had been assigned to improve drainage, their pieces were also destroyed in the fire’s path, although their pump operators were able to escape.

Upon reaching 5th Street, the fire traveled two city blocks north along 5th Street, now threatening four additional storage tanks and the 125-foot Penrose Avenue Bridge. At 5:37 p. m. , Commissioner Rizzo ordered the tenth alarm as the fire was now traveling southward and engulfing the refinery’s administration building, which was located on the south side of Avenue “Y” between 4th and 5th Streets. The tenth alarm companies were ordered to report to Gate 24 at Penrose and Lanier Avenues, to set up deluge guns and leave the area.

As the situation continued to deteriorate at the Gulf Refinery, Commissioner Rizzo ordered the 11th alarm. By seven o’clock, the involved tanks and pipelines were gushing flames and nearby streets in the complex were burning streams of oil and other petroleum products. The courageous men of the Philadelphia Fire Department kept with the fire, retaking 5th Street, 4th Street, and finally Avenue “Y. ” At 1:00 a. m. Commissioner Rizzo left the fire grounds to visit the injured firefighters in the hospital. Rizzo then gave command to Deputy Fire Commissioner Harry T. Kite who placed the fire under control at 5:38 a. m. on Monday, August 18, 1975. The tragedy that occurred on the hot august day in 1975 could have been avoided all together if the refinery personnel in charge of Tank 231 simply monitored the amount of crude oil being pumped into the tank. Mistakes do happen, but unfortunately this mistake took the lives of eight firefighters. As of now we can only take this disaster into consideration and make sure this doesn’t ever happen again in the future. In remembrance of the firefighters who perished in the blaze: John Andrews, 49, Engine 49.

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