Case for a National Missile Defense

The United States political groups and those specialized public and private sectors outside the government have evidently manifested strong interest in deploying a ballistic missile defense to protect the United States from attack. The ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty prevents nationwide defense but actually allows the United States to launch up to 100 interceptors for long-range ballistic missiles at a single site (Causewell, 2002 p.75). On the other hand, critics and socially concerned groups have provided many thoughtful arguments for saying that NMD should not even continue or progress in its development (Lindsay, 2002 p.144).

The current trend of argument nowadays brought by the public pressuring sectors and those concerned in the countries militaristic defense is the abolishment of the treaty. Many supporters of National Missile Defense (NMD) state that the United States should initiate an amendment or abrogation of ABM treaty so that it can further execute the development of NMD for the maximizing the countries’ defense potential (Causewell, 2002 p.75). To consider, there are actually many political personnel in the Congress that do not agree with the Clinton Administration’s approach arguing that the threat justified the more rapid deployment of an NMD system.

Significantly, there have been a wide debate and argument accompanied by this procedure. Most objection are concerned mainly on the defense status of the country upon the initiation of the project, while positive side argues that this kind of technology might provide the United States the potential to obtain the edge of their defense system. In the study, the primary discussion involves the issue on NMD and its actual presence in the United States. The main inquiry of the discussion resides to the fact of proving the most appropriate argument for the paper to support. This accompanies evidences and historical accounts that are shown during the whole course of the discussion.

Discussion

Historical Background

The United States has pursued the development and deployment of defenses against long-range ballistic missiles since the early 1950s. It launched a treaty-compliant area located in North Dakota during the mid-1970s; however, its operation was closed only after a few months. President Reagan initiated a development plan in order to further enhance the program into a more intensive defense during the time of early 1980s, but these programs were reverted back on several occasions during the Reagan and Bush Administrations (Causewell, 2002 p.75).

Most evidently, from the historical perspective, the Clinton Administration initially centered its attention in developing the technological aspect of the NMD project; however, in 1996, the administration itself  provided an outline indicating a strategy to initiate the further development and deployment of an NMD system by 2003 if the threat warranted and the technology was ready (Causewell, 2002 p.76).

During January 1999, the Clinton Administration announced that it had adjusted this program to permit deployment in 2005, and would decide in summer 2000 whether to proceed with deployment of up to 20 at a single site (Causewell, 2002 p.76). Fortunately, this statement of the administrator was modified in February 2000 to include and permit the 100 interceptors. Most knowingly, the Bush Administration prefers to possess an intensive and robust NMD program that is likely to include land, sea and space-based assets.

As the statement of the President exemplified, he remarked intensively to the Administration’s commitment to missile defenses in a speech on May 1, 2001 (Causewell, 2002 p.75). This scenario even proves that the initiation of NDM is within the plans of the Bush administrator; hence, its existence as one of the Government’s military and defense program is present. The U.S Senate’s votes last October 1999 against the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the renewed drive in recent years toward the deployment of a U.S. The issues on NMD system have initiated the analysts in the United States and international aspect to express their concern about the apparent U.S. trend toward a unilateral approach to security (Patrick & Forman, 2002 p.242).

The Clinton Administration provided different aspects about the deployment of an NMD system. These components provided by the administration served as the primary guide in the technical management of the program. As per the administrations instructions, these components included an assessment of the threat to the United States form long-range ballistic missiles, an assessment of the maturity of the technology and the feasibility of deploying an effective system, consideration of the implications for the ABM Treaty and the possibility of gaining Russian agreement on amendments, the potential costs of the prospective system, and the environmental implications of deployment (Causewell, 2002 p.75).

Many political groups questioned the Administration’s commitment to NMD funding and deployment. News and arguments point out that the government provided these additional funds in order to speed up the construction and development of the NMD program; however, this resulted to more inquiries and curiosity among the concerned public.

In additional to this government effort, the Administration even passed legislation from both the House and the Senate passed on NMD deployment to further increase its phasing. Considering the Congress and White House have evidently merged and controlled the by the Republican Party, the advocates and supporters of NMD should expect a congressional approval for Bush administration plan (Causewell, 2002 p.75).

Theories on Problems at Stake

Political parties present in the Congress and other concerned sectors have a strong preference for the launching of ballistic missile defense (BMD) system to add up to the defensive power of the United States. In can be recalled during the time Soviet Union collapse that occurred predominantly in 1991, Iraq utilized their Scud missiles in the event of Persian Gulf War, and the use of ballistic missile technologies, all piled up as primary risk of the United States.

Significantly, there are two historical scenarios in the summer of 1998 that provided these significant concerns (Causewell, 2002 p.76). First, during the accounts that occurred in July, from the congressionally-operated committee headed by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld concluded that United State’s search to further enhance their long-range ballistic missiles might be able to attain such target in the p of 5 years of deciding; however, it is essential that the United States should have, at the very least, warning before conducting the tests and deployment of such missiles.

Second, during the ending periods of the month of August, North Korea flight tested 3-stage ballistic missiles. Even though the third stage of this missile did not make it through during its first flight, and this missile would not have possessed such range to attain the continental United States, North Korea manifested that it had built the technology for “staged” missiles, which has been an important discovery and influence in the field of longer-range ballistic missiles development (Causewell, 2002 p.76).

According to political groups, the threatening aspect of this NMD program to the United States is from the fact that only a handful of countries, most of which are probably not now close to having operational intercontinental missiles. These groups have argued that the United States are not yet prepared for building a fully operating NMD system, and the risks involved are too extensive to initiate such goal. One of the problems that might arise is that enemies can attack the United States in ways that do not require long- range missile.

The situation of NMD can make the nation vulnerable to other nation’s possible attack. Moreover, NMD could jeopardize arms control and related efforts such as the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program intended to secure nuclear warheads and materials within Russia (Lindsay, 2002 p.144). Considering that Bush Administration still has no initiated a detail blueprint or outline for this program in terms of its prospective missile defense architecture, or any detailed and documented motives to initiate the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

However, in meetings with NATO defense ministers in Brussels on June 7, 2001, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated that the Bush Administration would purse in the facilitation and enhancement of missile defenses and that scrapping of the ABM Treaty was “inevitable” since it greatly prevented both testing and launching of missile defenses (Causewell, 2002 p.76).

In the United States, opponents of the CTBT and proponents of NMD assert that their views are driven not by isolationism or unilateralism, but rather by their belief that post—Cold War threats demand new approaches to U.S security. However, the perceived resurgence in U.S. unilateralism nevertheless has grave consequences for both U.S. and international security. A particularly troubling aspect of recent U.S behavior has been the overt dismissal of the views of allies on the issues of CTBT ratification and NMD (Patrick & Forman, 2002 p.242).

Recommendation and Policy Options

In providing these recommendations, there are certain things that need to be considered in order to come up with the rightful justifications of the decisions made. First, ballistic missile technology, such as long-range missile technology and NMD, is currently being developed in other countries as the use of it in defensive power is being considered progressively. There is a factual possibility  that Iran, Iraq, or North Korea will obtain the capacity to attack the United States using this technology.

Hence, this is the initial point to consider in defending against this type of advanced technology for the reason that, the United States might be overrun by these features if they will not incorporate such technology within their defense system (Lindsay, 2002 p.144). Second, the technology for shooting down the enemy’s incoming missiles is not as feasible and accurately done in real time setting—particularly when matched against the small long-range missile arsenals that countries such as Iraq, Iran, or North Korea could plausibly facilitate in the years ahead (Lindsay, 2002 p.144).

The use of enhanced sensors, computerized systems, and missile technology should soon provide the possibility of carrying out a high-reliability intercepts. The advantage of this is the promulgation of enhanced interceptors and substitutes it for the use of Nuclear Bomb. Third reason to consider is the ending the cold war that initiated an opportunity to recap the contribution of U.S missile technology to its national security policy and in U.S.-Russian relations.

Fourth, the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which is considered as one of the major threats in the United States can be nullified by the developing the NMD. As for the missile technological experts, they claim that the development of this NMD and enhancement of its features and missile technology can potentate in the development of such super-defensive nation. Lastly, nuclear deterrence, while reliable in most circumstances, cannot always guarantee its success as it is also not as feasible type of defense.

Such Deterrence should not be assumed to apply under such circumstances, since the threats present against the country would already be confronting extreme annihilation even if it did not use NMD against the United States. For these five reasons, the advantage for pursuing the development and initiation of the NMD program dominate; hence, from its summed up rationale, the strength the United States can obtain with the use of such technology centers in the fact that they can actually provide massive defense advantage over the possible attack of other countries that may have the potential of using the same kind of technology.

Conclusion

In the discussion of the study, the prime conditions that have been obtained is the wide support of NMD progression among the political and military groups for the reason of U.S advancement in the field of national defense. From the discussion above, five recommendations are previewed in order to depict the advantages of incorporating such system in the national defense, which as a whole, pertains to the advancement of country’s defense against outside threats. This project has been preferred by Bush administration, although arguments have been present to the ABM treaty and other support groups negation of project’s launching and development.

References

1. Causewell, E. V. (2002). National Missile Defense: Issues and Developments. Nova Publishers.
2. Lindsay, J. M. (2002). Defending America: The Case for Limited National Missile Defense. Brookings Institution Press.
3. Patrick, S., & Forman, S. (2002). Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

 

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Case for a National Missile Defense. (2017, May 10). Retrieved from https://phdessay.com/case-for-a-national-missile-defense/

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