Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, Inc. FIN Professor XXX XXXX Month xx, xxxx History Krispy Kreme was founded by Vernon Rudolph after he purchased the famous secret recipe of yeast-raised doughnuts in 1937 from a French chef in New Orleans. Rudolph began to sell these doughnuts wholesale to supermarkets.
The demand for his doughnuts grew quickly, and by cutting a hole in the wall of the factory to sell directly to customers the concept of Krispy Kreme retail stores was born. The retail concept for Krispy Kreme doughnuts allowed Rudolph to grow his factory stores to 29 shops in 12 states by the late 1950’s.
When Rudolph died in 973 Beatrice Foods bought his company and expanded it to more than 100 locations and expanded the menu to include soups and sandwiches. Beatrice tried to reduce costs by changing the appearance of the stores and using cheaper ingredients. This negatively affected the company and Beatrice sold the company to a group of franchise owners. This group of owners was led by Joseph McAleer, who was the first Krispy Kreme franchisee. The leveraged buyout was completed for $24 million in 1982. The new group brought back the original recipe and logo.
By 1989 the group was almost debt free and they were beginning to expand. The company CEO, Scott Livengood, took the company public in April of 2000. The share price after the first day was $40. 63. Holes in Doughnut Accounting Practices In May of 2004 Krispy Kreme announced to its investors that they should expect earnings to be 10% lower than predicted. It was at this time that the low-carb diet had taken the U. S by storm, and Krispy Kreme blamed this low-carb diet for their low wholesale and retail sales.
They also announced the sales of a the Montana Mills bakery chain of 28 bakery cafe’s that had been acquired in January of 2003 for $40 million in stock. Krispy Kreme also announced that the Hot Doughnut and Coffee Shops were falling short of expectations and three of them were closing at a cost of $7 to $8 million. Krispy Kreme (KKD) stock price closed down 30% that day. Shortly after on May 25th, 2004 when the Wall Street Journal published a story about how Krispy Kreme handled is accounting for franchise acquisitions.
According to the article Krispy Kreme recorded the interest paid by the franchisee as interest income for immediate profit, except that Krispy Kreme booked the purchase cost of the franchise as an intangible asset and did not amortize it. In the repurchase agreement of the 7 stores in Michigan, they allowed one of the franchises top executives to stay on with the company after the repurchase. This executive left the company shortly after closing the deal, and had to pay him $5 million in severance which Krispy Kreme also rolled into the unamortized-asset category. Krispy Kreme claimed it followed GAAP standards and had done nothing wrong.
The final shoe to drop as on July 29th, 2004 when Krispy Kreme announced that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had launched an informal investigation related to “franchise reacquisitions and the company’s previously announced reduction in earning guidance”. Krispy Kreme (KK) shares fell another 15%. The revelations about the companies accounting practices and showing interest as immediate income and not amortizing the repurchased franchises but rather showing them as intangible assets alone could justify the devaluation of their stock price by approx. 45%.
Couple their earnings decline and the announcement of store closings and it easily can be justified. Couple that with the fear of the unknown. If Krispy Kreme was treating their interest and reacquired franchises as they were which seems to be blatantly wrong, what else might the SEC find during their investigation? This fear would certainly drive investors away and their share price down. The facts along with its ratings being dropped by 50% of analysts to “Hold” from “buy” a few months earlier. Krispy Kreme Deep Fried and Possible Deeper Issues Krispy Kreme grew incredibly quickly in the years leading up to the nvestigation (as shown in the chart below) and then may have tried to meet Wall Street expectations through some questionable practices such as shipping more product or pulling ahead product orders, then allowing the orders to be returned shortly after for credit. “Testimony by a former sales manager at a Krispy Kreme outlet in Ohio, said a regional manager ordered that retail store customers be sent double orders on the last Friday and Saturday of the 2004 fiscal year, explaining “that Krispy Kreme wanted to boost the sales for the fiscal year in order to meet Wall Street projections. The witness said the manager explained that the doughnuts would be returned for credit the following week – once fiscal 2005 was under way” (Chin, 2005). It seems pretty clear that Krispy Kreme was using questionable methods to inflate profits. Investors also later found out that Scott Livengood (CEO), the former COO John W. Tate, and the former CFO Randy Casstevens, “unloaded more than 475,000 shares of Krispy Kreme stock for proceeds of $19. 8 Million”, (Chin, 2005) while they were fully aware sales were declining since January of 2003.
During this investigation, Scott Livengood, Krispy Kreme’s CEO announced his retirement. It would seem to me that there may be some deeper issues with Krispy Kreme and if I were a shareholder I would want out, or to be certain that Krispy Kreme’s accounting mess was cleaned up. The chart below shows Krispy Kreme’s performance during the years leading up to the investigation. Krispy Kreme Re-made Fresh Today Krispy Kreme’s stock has not fully recovered, (see chart below), but as of the end of 2012 Krispy Kreme seems to have made a comeback. “Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, Inc. Krispy Kreme) is a retailer and wholesaler of doughnuts complementary beverages and treats and packaged sweets. The Company’s principal business is owning and franchising Krispy Kreme stores, at which a variety of doughnuts, including the Company’s Original Glazed doughnut, are sold and distributed together with complementary products, and where a broad array of coffees and other beverages are offered. As of January 29, 2012, there were 234 Krispy Kreme stores operated domestically in 38 states and in the District of Columbia, and there were 460 shops in 20 other countries around the world.
Of the 694 total stores, 292 were factory stores and 402 were satellites. The Company operates in four segments: Company Stores, domestic franchise stores, international franchise stores, and the KK Supply Chain” (“Krispy Kreme Doughnuts”). As of close of business on Friday last week KKD traded at $14. 80, way below its heyday when the stock traded in the $40’s but it is double its all-time low. Krispy Kreme doughnuts (KKD as of March 22, 2013 When compared to its competitors Krispy Kreme’s P/E is 49. 33. This is much higher than the others but its P/S is in the middle.
Krispy Kreme’s competitors are listed as Dunkin’ Brands Group, Einstein Noah restaurant Group, and Starbuck Corporation. Below is the direct competitor comparison. Direct Competitor Comparison| | | KKD| DNKN| BAGL| SBUX| Industry| Market Cap:| 989. 57M| 3. 94B| 253. 09M| 42. 99B| 384. 28M| Employees:| N/A| 1,104| 6,912| 160,000| 10. 87K| Qtrly Rev Growth (yoy):| 0. 16| -0. 04| -0. 04| 0. 11| 0. 30| Revenue (ttm): | 435. 84M| 658. 18M| 427. 01M| 13. 66B| 453. 84M| Gross Margin (ttm):| 0. 17| 0. 79| 0. 21| 0. 57| 0. 31| EBITDA (ttm):| 47. 93M| 304. 86M| 48. 46M| 2. 46B| 47. 5M| Operating Margin (ttm): | 0. 09| 0. 38| 0. 07| 0. 14| 0. 07| Net Income (ttm):| 20. 78M| 108. 18M| 12. 74M| 1. 43B| N/A| EPS (ttm):| 0. 30| 0. 93| 0. 74| 1. 86| 0. 78| P/E (ttm):| 49. 33| 39. 95| 20. 01| 30. 87| 29. 99| PEG (5 yr expected):| 1. 02| 1. 58| 0. 98| 1. 43| 1. 50| P/S (ttm):| 2. 24| 5. 96| 0. 59| 3. 13| 1. 04| | | | | Suggestions for a Krisp/Klean Future Making Doughnuts I three things I might suggest if I were the CFO for Krispy Kreme doughnuts would be to insure open communication with investors and insure them that internal auditing systems are in place.
I’m sure that investors lost all trust in the previous management because of the questionable practices that were followed. Krispy Kreme needs to rebuild that trust by having open lines of communication with its investors. I would take a serious look at closing unprofitable stores, and research other markets to open more stores. Some areas may still be underperforming while others are booming. Concentrate on the areas that show better potential and take advantage of that market while it is supporting growth. Because their competitors seem to offer expanded menus I would concentrate on healthy choices for the lunchtime crowd.
Everyone is aware of Krispy Kreme’s doughnuts, but I’m not so sure their other menu items are well known as an option for lunch/brunch. Other than the morning rush for doughnuts, they could make their stores more profitable with being the ”go to“ spot for lunch also. References Chin, N. (2005). Krispy Kreme Dougnuts: Empty calories or empty profits? Retrieved from http://www. corporateconflicts. com/index-sb-cases-kk. html Krispy kreme doughnuts. (n. d. ). Retrieved from http://www. google. com/finance? client=ob&q=NYSE:KKD