Criminal Procedure

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004)
[Due Process – Enemy Combatant]
President has authority to detain citizens as enemy combatants only if picked up on battlefield in Afghanistan
Due process demands a US citizen held in the US as an enemy combatant is entitled to meaningful opportunity to contest factual basis for his detention before neutral decision maker
Includes right to counsel
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004)
[Due Process – Enemy Combatant – Indefinite Detention]
Reviewing court will weigh private interest of detained citizen against governmental interest in determining whether to sustain enemy combatant designation
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006)
[Due Process – Enemy Combatant – Trial]
held that military commissions set up by the Bush administration to try detainees at Guantanamo Bay lack “the power to proceed because its structures and procedures violate both the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the four Geneva Conventions signed in 1949. Because the rules governing Hamdan’s commission dispense with the principles of international law that an accused must, absent disruptive conduct or consent, be present for his trial and must be privy to the evidence against them they violate Common Article 3’s standard.
Boumedience v. Bush
[Due Process – Enemy Combatant – Habeas Corpus]
The prisoners had a right to the habeas corpus under the United States Constitution and that the Military Commissions Act of 2006 was an unconstitutional suspension of that right. The United States, by virtue of its complete jurisdiction and control, maintains “de facto” sovereignty over this territory, while Cuba retained ultimate sovereignty over the territory, to hold that the aliens detained as enemy combatants on that territory were entitled to the writ of habeas corpus protected in Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution. If Congress intends to suspend that right it must do so in accordance with the Constitution.
Boumediene v. Bush
[Due Process – Enemy Combatant – CSRTs]
Only if there is an adequate substitute for habeas corpus – CSRTs not adequate substitute
No right to counsel; detainee can’t see all evidence against him; detainee very limited in evidence he can present
Review of CSRT decisions limited to whether CSRT complied with its own procedures – can’t order detainee released
Gideon v. Wainwright (1963)
[6th Amendment Right to Counsel]
Defendants in state felony trials have right to counsel, it is a fundamental right. Reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.
Argersinger v. Hamlin (1972)
[6th Amendment Right to Counsel – Misdemeanors]
D cannot be imprisoned for any offense (including misdemeanors) unless he was represented by counsel. We are by no means convinced that legal and constitutional questions involved in a cast that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period are any less complex than when a person can be sent off for six months or more. We need not consider the requirements of the Sixth Amendment as regards the right to counsel where loss of liberty is not involved, for here, petitioner was in fact sentenced to jail. Every judge will know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment may be imposed unless the accused is represented by counsel.
Scott v. Illinois (1979)
[6th Amendment Right to Counsel – Misdemeanors]
Refused to extend Argersinger to cases where possible imprisonment but jail time not imposed – must be actual incarceration. “Actual imprisonment” standard
Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973)
[6th Amendment Right to Counsel – Probation and Parole Revocation Hearings – Analysis]
An indigent probationer or parolee has no unqualified due process right to be represented by counsel at revocation hearings. While counsel is required at every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected, does not apply to revocation hearings where probationer was sentenced at the time of trial. It would change the nature of the proceeding. Become more like a judge and less attuned to the rehabilitative needs of the individual. May be less tolerant of marginal deviant behavior and feel more pressure to reincarcerate rather than continue nonpunitive rehabilitation.
Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973)
[6th Amendment Right to Counsel – Probation and Parole Revocation Hearings – Rule]
Counsel should be provided in cases where, after being informed of his right to request counsel, the probationer or parolee makes such a request, based on a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not committed the alleged violation of the conditions upon which he is at liberty; or (ii) that there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present.
Griffin v. Illinois (1956)
[6th Amendment Right to Counsel – Transcripts]
State must furnish free transcript of trial to indigent D where transcript necessary for review [included in right to counsel].
Extends to filing fees, transcript of state habeas corpus proceeding if needed to file habeas corpus in higher court, transcript of preliminary hearing, transcript of mistrial after hung jury.
There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has. Destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts.
Douglas v. California (1963)
[6th Amendment Right to Counsel – Appeals]
Indigent has right to appointed attorney for 1st appeal where appeal is matter of right (Court of Appeal). Under the California procedure, appellate courts had to appoint counsel only if in their opinion it would be helpful to the defendant or the court. When an indigent is forced to run this gantlet of a preliminary showing of merit, the right to appeal does not comport with fair procedure. The discrimination is not between possibly good and obviously bad cases, but between cases where the rich man can require the court to listen but a poor man cannot. The indigent, where the record is unclear or the errors are hidden, has only the right to a meaningless ritual, while the rich man has a meaningful appeal.
Ross v. Moffitt (1974)
[6th Amendment Right to Counsel – Appeals]
No right to appointed counsel for discretionary review. The purpose of the trial stage from the State’s point of view is to convert a criminal defendant from a person presumed innocent to one found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. By contrast, it is ordinarily the defendant who initiates the appellate process. The defendant needs an attorney on appeal not as a shield to protect him against being haled into court by the State and stripped of his presumption of innocence, but rather as a sword to upset the prior determination of guilt. Unfairness results on ly if indigents are singled out by the State and denied meaningful access to that system because of their poverty. At that stage he will have, at the very least, a transcript or other record of trial proceedings, a brief on his behalf in the Court of Appeals setting forth his claims of error, and in many cases an opinion by the Court of Appeals disposing of his case. These materials, supplemented by whatever submission respondent may make pro se, would appear to provide the Supreme Court of North Carolina with an adequate basis on which to base its decision. The duty of the State under our cases is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing effort to reverse his conviction, but only to assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly.
Ake v. Oklahoma (1985)
[14th Amendment Due Process – Psychiatrists]
Right to free psychiatrist where D shows:
1) sanity at time of offense likely to be significant at trial OR
2) at capital sentencing hearing, prosecution presents evidence of future dangerousness.
Where the consequence of error is so great, the relevance of responsive psychiatric testimony so evident, and the burden on the State so slim, due process requires access to a psychiatric examination on relevant issues, to the testimony of the psychiatrist, and to assistance in preparation at the sentencing phase.
Faretta v. California (1975)
[6th Amendment Right to Counsel – Pro Se]
Government can’t compel D to be represented by lawyer when voluntarily & intelligently elects to represent self
Judge must make finding
The right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails. The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel, like the other defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment, shall be an aid to a willing defendant – not an organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself personally. When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes many of the traditional benefits of counsel. For this reason, the accused must knowingly and intelligently forego those benefits. Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez (2006)
[6th Amendment Right to Counsel – Attorney of Choice]
A D who can afford to pay for an attorney has right to lawyer of her choice
D need not show she was denied fair trial & was prejudiced by not having attorney of choice – automatic reversal
Denial of right to attorney of choice = structural error, not subject to harmless error test
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice commands, not that a trial be fair, but that a particular guarantee of fairness be provided-to wit, that the accused be defended by the counsel he believes to be best. The right at stake here is the right to counsel of choice, not the right to a fair trial; and that right was violated because the deprivation of counsel was erroneous. No additional showing of prejudice is required to make the violation complete.
Strickland v. Washington (1984)
[6th Amendment Right to Counsel – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel]
The right to counsel = right to effective counsel
D must show ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC):
1) representation fell below objective standard of reasonableness AND
2) reasonable probability that but for unprofessional errors, result would’ve been different.
The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Proceed on the assumption that the decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the standards that govern the decision.
Lafler v. Cooper (2012)
[6th Amendment Right to Counsel – Plea Bargain]
D has right to effective assistance of counsel to decide whether to accept offered plea bargain
D can show prejudice if loss of plea opportunity led to trial where D is convicted on more serious charges or gets more severe sentence
The constitutional guarantee applied to pretrial critical stages that are part of the whole course of a criminal proceeding. Any amount of additional jail time has Sixth Amendment significance. Criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials. The right to adequate assistance of counsel cannot be defined or enforced without taking account of the central role plea bargaining plays in securing convictions and determining sentences.
Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California (2000)
[6th Amendment Right to Counsel – Self Representation on Appeal]
No right to self-representation on appeal
Appeals as of right in federal courts were nonexistent for the first century of our Nation, and appellate review of any sort was rarely allowed. Thus, unlike the inquiry in Faretta, the historical evidence does not provide any support for an affirmative constitutional right to appellate self-representation. The Sixth Amendment does not include any right to appeal. It necessarily follows that the Amendment itself does not provide any basis for finding a right to self-representation on appeal.
Rompilla v. Beard (2005)
[6th Amendment Right to Counsel – Duty of Defense Counsel]
In capital case, even where D doesn’t give counsel leads for mitigation, counsel has duty to review prosecutor’s aggravating evidence
It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and to explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty in the event of conviction. The investigation should always include efforts to secure information in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities. The duty to investigate exists regardless of the accused’s admissions or statements. Counsel fell short here because they failed to make reasonable efforts to review the prior conviction file, despite knowing that the prosecution intended to introduction the prior conviction and quote damaging testimony of the rape victim in that case. The unreasonableness of attempting no more than they did was heightened by the easy availability of the file at the trial courthouse, and the great risk that testimony would hamstring the counsel’s chosen defense of residual doubt.
Mapp v. Ohio (1961)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Exclusionary Rule]
Exclusionary Rule can be used by defendants in state proceedings
14th Amendment due process clause makes 4th Amendment applicable to state proceedings.
Miss Mapp refused police entrance without a search warrant. Police forcibly entered and searched entire house eventually finding the evidence they used in her trial. Court reversed Wolf finding other remedies have completely failed to secure compliance with the constitutional provisions. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter by removing the incentive to disregard it. The imperative of judicial integrity. The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its existence.
United States v. Leon (1984)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Exclusionary Rule – Good Faith Exception – Rule]
requires suppression only where:
-officer dishonest or reckless in preparing affidavit;
-officer could not have had objectively reasonable belief in existence of probable cause (staleness)
-magistrate not detached and neutral
Objectively reasonable belief – whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization. All the circumstances – including whether the warrant application had previously been rejected – may be considered.
United States v. Leon (1984)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Exclusionary Rule – Good Faith Exception – Analysis]
The rule operates as a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right. By balancing the the costs and benefits the outcome is to permit the introduction of evidence obtained in the reasonable good-faith belief that a search or seizure was in accord with the Fourth Amendment. First, the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates. Second, there exists no evidence suggesting that judges and magistrates are included to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment. Third, there is no basis that exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant will have a significant deterrent effect on the issuing judge or magistrate. Judges and magistrates are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team; as neutral judicial officers they have no stake in the outcome of particular prosecutions. The threat of exclusion tus cannot be expected significantly to deter them.
Hudson v. Michigan (2006)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Exclusionary Rule – Knock and Announce]
No suppression for violation of knock & announce
Exclusionary Rule (ER) is a last resort
Police executing a warrant for drugs and firearms at Hudson’s home announce their presence, but waited only 3 – 5 seconds before entering. Suppression of evidence has always been our last resort. The exclusionary rule generates substantial social costs, which include setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large and the costly toll upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives. Have held it applicable only where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served – where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs. What constituted a reasonable wait time, how many seconds in fact were waited, or whether there was a reasonable suspicion exception is difficult for the trial court to determine. Also, police may wait too long and run into violence or destruction of the evidence. The value of deterrence depends upon the strength of the incentive to commit the forbidden act. Ignoring knock-and-announce can realistically be expected to achieve absolutely nothing except the prevention of destruction of evidence and the avoidance of life-threatening resistance by occupants. Also, another remedy is Section 1983 civil suits.
Herring v. United States (2009)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Exclusionary Rule – Negligence – Analysis]
Police told in error of an outstanding arrest warrant. Here the error was the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest. To the extent that application of the exclusionary rule could provide some incremental deterrent that possible benefit must be weighed against its substantial social costs. The extent to which the exclusionary rule is justified by these deterrence principles varies with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct. Evidence should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional. The pertinent analysis of deterrence and culpability is objective – whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal in light of all the circumstances. If the police have been shown to be reckless in maintaining a warrant system, or to have knowingly made false entries to lay the groundwork for future false arrests, exclusion would be justified.
Herring v. United States (2009)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Exclusionary Rule – Negligence – Rule]
ER is a last resort – no automatic suppression for 4th Amendment violation
Suppression only when intentional or reckless violation of 4th or systemic department violations of search & seizure
Now good faith & negligent police behavior protected by good faith exception
ER will apply only if it would deter the specific police misconduct & if, on balance, deterrence gained outweighs cost of possibly letting guilty go free
Katz v. United States (1967)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Protected Areas – Rule]
4th Amendment protects people, not just places, against unreasonable searches & seizures
4th Amendment search or seizure occurs if person has a reasonable expectation of privacy
Reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone conversations.
Katz v. United States (1967)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Protected Areas – Analysis]
The FBI had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public telephoner booth where defendant had placed his calls. The Fourth Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion. The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. One who occupies the booth, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters will not be broadcast to the world. The Government’s activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
California v. Greenwood (1988)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Protected Areas – Garbage]
No reasonable expectation of privacy in trash left at curb. Police had the neighborhood garbage collector pick up opaque plastic bags of garbage and turn them over. Evidence of narcotics was found and served as the basis for a search warrant. Plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public. Left there with the express purpose of conveying it to a third party. The police cannot reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed by any member of the public. A person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.
Oliver v. United States (1984)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Protected Areas – Curtilage]
No reasonable expectation of privacy in open field not within curtilage. The special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their persons, houses, papers and effects, is not extended to the open fields. Open fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance. These lands usually are accessible to the public and the police in ways that a home, on office, or commercial structure is not. Fences and no trespassing signs do not effectively bar the public from viewing open fields in rural areas. The test of legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly private activity. Rather, the correct inquiry is whether the government’s intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment.
United States v. Dunn (1987)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Protected Areas – Curtilage]
factors to determine curtilage:
-proximity of area claimed to be curtilage to the home;
-is area within enclosure around home;
-nature of uses of area;
-steps resident took to protect area from observation
The curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life, and therefore has been considered part of home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes. Look to the factors that determine whether an individual reasonably may expect that an area immediately adjacent to the home will remain private.
See v. City of Seattle (1967)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Protected Areas – Office]
Office has same protection as home. The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonably official entries upon his private commercial property.
Hudson v. Palmer (1984)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Protected Areas – Prison Cell]
No reasonable expectation of privacy in prison cell. A right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure institutional security and internal order. The loss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of confinement.
United States v. Place (1983)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Protected Areas – Dog Sniff of Luggage]
Canine sniff not a search, but taking of luggage is a seizure. A person possess a privacy interest in the contents of personal luggage that is protected. A canine sniff by a well-trained narcotics detection dog does not require opening the luggage. It does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view. The manner in which information obtained through this investigative technique is much less intrusive than a typical search. The sniff discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics. The information obtained is limited. This limited disclosure also ensures that the owner of the property is not subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in more intrusive methods. Exposure of respondent’s luggage, which was located in a public place, to a trained canine – did not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Bond v. United States (2000)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Protected Areas – Luggage on a bus]
There is a reasonable expectation of privacy in luggage carried onto a bus
Squeezing luggage = search
Police must follow 4th Amendment requirements (search warrant or exception to warrant requirement)
A traveler’s personal luggage is clearly an effect protected by the Fourth Amendment. When a bus passenger places a bag in an overhead bin, he expects that other passengers or bus employees may move it but not that they’ll feel the bag in an exploratory manner. Therefore, the agent’s physical manipulation of petitioner’s bag violated the Fourth Amendment.
Kyllo v. United States (2001)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Protected Areas – Thermal Imaging]
Thermal imaging scan = search so police must comply with 4th Amendment (search warrant or exception to warrant requirement). Federal agents suspecting Kyllo was growing marijuana in his home, used a thermal imager from the street. Based on that information a search warrant was issued. Obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion constitutes a search – at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use. In the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.
United States v. Jones (2012)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Protected Areas – GPS tracker]
Government’s installation of GPS tracking device & its use to monitor vehicle’s movements constitutes a search. Government agents installed a GPS tracking device on defendant’s Jeep and tracked it for 28 days producing over 2000 pages of data. The Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information. A trespass on houses or effects, or a Katz invasion of privacy, is not alone a search unless it is done to obtain information; and the obtaining of information is not alone a search unless it is achieved by such a trespass or invasion of privacy.
Florida v. Jardines (2013)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Protected Areas – Dog Sniff on Curtilage]
If no permission to be in curtilage = search
Scope of license – consider area and purpose
After police received a tip Jardines was growing marijuana they took a drug-detection dog onto Jardines’ front porch where the dog alerted. On this basis police obtained a search warrant. The officers were gathering information in an area belonging to Jardines which we have held enjoys protection. While law enforcement officers need not shield their eyes when passing by the home on public thoroughfares, must have leave to inspect the area protected. A license may be implied from the habits of the country, this license typically permits the visitor to approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received and then leave. But introducing a trained police dog to explore the area in hopes of discovering incriminating evidence is beyond scope. The scope of a license – express or implied – is limited not only to a particular area but also to a specific purpose. Whether the officer’s conduct was an objectively reasonable search turns on whether the officers had an implied license to enter the porch, which turns on the purpose for which they entered.
Andresen v. Maryland (1976)
[5th Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination – Business Records]
Seizure of business records from office doesn’t violate 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Petitioner was not asked to say or to do anything. The records seized contained statements petitioner had voluntarily committed to writing. The search for and seizure of these records were conducted by law enforcement. When records introduced at trial, they were authenticated by a handwriting expert, not by petitioner. Any compulsion of petitioner to speak was not present. Although the Fifth Amendment may protect an individual fro complying with a subpoena for the production of his personal records in his possession because the very act of production may constitute a compulsory authentication of incriminating information, a seizure of the same materials by law enforcement officers differs – the individual against whom the search is directed is not required to aid in the discovery, production, or authentication of incriminating evidence.
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily (1978)
[Fourth Amendment Right of Privacy – Protected Areas – Search of Third Party]
A search warrant may be issued to search property of innocent third party if based on probable cause. Police obtained and executed a warrant to search the offices of the Sanford Daily for pictures to id those who had injured policemen during a campus demonstration. If the third party knows that contraband or other illegal materials on on his property, he is sufficiently culpable to justify the issuance of a search warrant and if he doesn’t know, he will be informed when the search warrant is served. The choice to use a search warrant is likely to be based on the solid belief, arrived at through experience that the warranted search is necessary to secure and to avoid the destruction of evidence. Properly administered, the pre-conditions for a warrant – probable cause, specificity with respect to the place to be searched and the things to be seized, and overall reasonableness – should afford sufficient protection aginst the harm that are assertedly threatened by warrants for searching newspaper offices.
[4th Amendment Right to Privacy – Probable Cause – Rule]
2-prong test:
1) reliability (veracity) of CI or his info AND
2) basis for CI’s knowledge
can substitute for prongs:
1) corroboration by police OR
2) self-verifying detail of tip
-But then ask, even after corroborated, is tip as trustworthy as tip that satisfied both prongs?
Spinelli v. United States (1969)
[4th Amendment Right to Privacy – Probable Cause – Analysis]
No probable cause where search warrant issued based on Spinelli driving between St. Louis and Illinois, owning two telephones, CI statement that he was a bookmaker and he was known to the police as a bookmaker. Though the affiant swore that his confidant was reliable he offered the magistrate no reason to support this conclusion. It is especially important that the tip describe the accused’s criminal activity in sufficient detail that the magistrate may know that he is relying on something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based on reputation. Also the rest of the information merely indicates that Spinelli could have used the telephones for some purpose.
Illinois v. Gates (1983)
[4th Amendment Right to Privacy – Probable Cause – Rule]
overrules necessity for 2-prongs
-Totality of circumstances
-did magistrate have substantial basis (or fair probability) the conclude search would turn up evidence of crime
-2 prongs = circumstances to consider in totality, but no longer determinative
Illinois v. Gates (1983)
[4th Amendment Right to Privacy – Probable Cause – Analysis]
Police received an anonymous letter detailing travel plans of defendants. Stated the wife drives down to Florida, fills the car with drugs, the husband flies down and drives the car back to Illinois. Subsequent investigation established that Lance had flown down to Florida. A search warrant was obtained and search uncovered 350 lbs of marijuana in the car. The task of the issuing magistrate is to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. Here, the showing of probable cause was compelling. The police independently investigated, Florida is known as a source of narcotics, and Lance’s actions is as suggestive of a drug-run as it is a family vacation. Probable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.
United States v. Grubbs (2006)
[4th Amendment Right to Privacy – Probable Cause – Anticipatory Search Warrant – Rule]
anticipatory search warrants are legal:
1) if triggering event occurs, there’s fair probability search will reveal evidence of crime AND
2) there must be probable cause the triggering event will occur
United States v. Grubbs (2006)
[4th Amendment Right to Privacy – Probable Cause – Anticipatory Search Warrant – Analysis]
An anticipatory search warrant was issued upon an affidavit indicating that a controlled delivery of a package containing a videotape of child pornography would later be made to defendant’s residence and that the warrant would thereafter be executed. Anticipatory warrants are no different in principle from ordinary warrants. They require the magistrate to determine that it is now probable that contraband, evidence of a crime, or a fugitive will be on the described premises when the warrant is executed. For a conditioned anticipatory warrant to comply with the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of probable cause, two prerequisites of probability must be satisfied. It must be true not only that if the triggering condition occurs there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a a particular place, but also that there is probable cause to believe the triggering condition will occur. The supporting affidavit must provide the magistrate with sufficient information to evaluate both aspects of the probable cause determination.
Franks v. Delaware (1978)
[4th Amendment Right to Privacy – Probable Cause – Challenges to an Affidavit]
If D establishes by preponderance of evidence that officer used perjury or reckless disregard for truth of allegations in affidavit:
-Judge throws out those allegations & examines rest of affidavit for P.C.
-If not P.C. now – exclusion of evidence
Where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant’s request. In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and with the affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit.
McCray v. Illinois (1967)
[4th Amendment Right to Privacy – Probable Cause – Identification of CI]
P has no duty to disclose ID of CI if officers relied in good faith on credible info from reliable CI
This applies at PC stage (not at trial)
Based upon an informant’s information who had given reliable information 20 times previously, the police arrested and found heroin on defendant. Police officers need not invariably be required to disclose an informant’s identity if the trial judge is convinced, by evidence submitted in open court and subject to cross-examination, that the officers did rely in good faith upon credible information supplied by a reliable informant. The informer is a vital part of society’s defensive arsenal. Where the issue submitted upon an application for a warrant, the magistrate is trusted to evaluate the credibility of the affiant in an ex parte proceeding. The magistrate is concerned, not with whether the informant lied, but with whether the affiant is truthful in his recitation of what he was told. If the magistrate doubts the credibility of the affiant, he may require the informant be identified or produced.
Maryland v. Pringle (2003)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Probable Cause – Passengers – Rule]
Where contraband found in passenger compartment of car with multiple occupants, and all deny ownership, police can arrest all occupants of car
Maryland v. Pringle (2003)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Probable Cause – Passengers – Facts]
The car in which defendant was a passenger was stopped for speeding. There were three occupants, the driver and owner, the front-seat passenger and a back-seat passenger. When the driver open the glove compartment to retrieve the vehicle registration, the officer observed a large amount of rolled-up money. The officer ran the id and found no outstanding violations. The officer had the driver get out and issued him an oral warning. When a second patrol car arrived, the officer asked if the driver had any weapons or narcotics in the vehicle. The driver said no and consented to a search of the vehicle. The search yielded $763 from the glove compartment and 5 baggies of cocaine. The cocaine was found behind the backseat armrest. No man offered information as to ownership of the drugs or money. All three were arrested and transported to the police station. Later that morning, defendant gave an oral and written confession admitting to owning the cocaine and that the other occupants did not know about it.
Maryland v. Pringle (2003)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Probable Cause – Passengers – Analysis]
The substance of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt and that the belief of guilt must be particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized. In this case defendant was one of three men in which cash was found directly in front of him. The baggies were accessible to all three men. None took ownership. It is entirely reasonable to infer from these facts that any or all three of the occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine. Thus a reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe defendant committed the crime of possession of cocaine, either solely or jointly. Distinguished from Ybarra because in a small automobile, not a public tavern. A car passenger – unlike the unwitting tavern patron – will often be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and have the same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing.
Richards v. Wisconsin (1997)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Search Warrants – Gaining Entry]
Automatic no-knock S/W in all felony drug cases violates 4th Amendment. In order to justify a no-knock entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by for example, allowing the destruction of evidence.
United States v. Banks (2003)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Search Warrants – Gaining Entry]
If no exigent circumstances, look at facts known to police at time to see if reasonably appeared to them that D had time to get to door (size of house, etc.). In the absence of exigent circumstances, the issue is whether the occupant’s failure to admit the police fairly suggested a refusal to let them in, whether an occupant has had time to get to the door. This judgment is to be made upon the facts known by the police at the time. The amount of time needed would vary depending on the size of the establishment. Where the police claim exigent need to enter and such claim is deemed legitimate then the crucial fact is the particular exigency claimed. Here, the exigency was defendant’s attempt to flush cocaine. Made it reasonable to suspect imminent loss of evidence after the 15-20 second wait.
Ybarra v. Illinois (1979)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Search Warrants – Search of Person on Premises not Named]
Police cannot search anyone on premises not named in S/W unless additional facts to believe they have contraband or weapons. There was no reason to suppose that when the search warrant was issue the authorities had probable cause to believe any person, other than the bartender, would be violating the law. The complaint did not mention the patrons of the tavern. Not only was probable cause to search Ybarra absent at the time the warrant was issued; it was still absent when the police executed the warrant. Ybarra made no gestures indicative of criminal conduct, made no movements that might suggest an attempt to conceal contraband, and said nothing of a suspicious nature to the police. The police possessed a warrant based on probable cause to search the tavern in which Ybarra happened to be at the time the warrant was executed. But a person’s mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person. The frisk was not supported by a reasonable belief that he was armed and presently dangerous.
Michigan v. Summers (1981)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Search Warrants – Detention of Persons on Premises]
Person on premises during search can be detained if occupant, or if articulable suspicion of criminal activity. As police were about to execute a search warrant they encountered defendant descending the front steps. They requested his assistance in gaining entry and detained him while they searched the premises. After finding narcotics and ascertaining defendant owned the home, they arrested him, searched him, and found heroin. Seizure upheld on the basis of Terry. Some seizures constitute such limited intrusions on the personal security of those detained and are justified by such substantial law enforcement interests that they may be made on less than probable cause, so long as police have an articulable basis for suspecting criminal activity. The connection of an occupant to that home gives the police officer an easily identifiable and certain basis for determining that suspicion of criminal activity justifies a detention of that occupant.
Bailey v. United States (2013)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Search Warrants – Scope]
Police cannot detain former occupant one mile away from the premises in the search warrant – detention limited to immediate vicinity of premises to be searched
3 law enforcement interests in Summers don’t apply here: officer safety, facilitating completion of the search, preventing flight.
Limiting detention to immediate vicinity of the premises squares with the three important law enforcement interests. An absent occupant poses little risk to officer safety. Flight is limited to the damage that potential flight can cause to the integrity of the search.
Muehler v. Mena (2005)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Search Warrants – Handcuffs]
Police can handcuff persons lawfully detained during execution of S/W
Duration of detention can affect reasonableness
Execution of a search warrant for deadly weapons and evidence of gang membership at a home believed to be involved in a recent drive-by shooting involved the handcuffing of the occupants. While the handcuffing made the detention more intrusive such action was reasonable because the governmental interests outweighed the marginal intrusion. In such inherently dangerous situations, the use of handcuffs minimizes the risk of harm to both officers and occupants.
Horton v. California (1990)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Search Warrants – Seizure of items not named – Rule]
Police can seize items not named in S/W:
-must be lawfully on premises (lawful S/W)
-item found in plain view
-discovery need not be inadvertent
-need pre-existing probable cause & item reasonably connected to case
Horton v. California (1990)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Search Warrants – Seizure of items not named – Analysis]
A police officer’s affidavit established probable cause to search defendant’s home for the proceeds of a robbery and for the weapons used in that robbery, but the magistrate issued warrant only for the proceeds. The proceeds were not found but the guns were. Evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer. The fact that an officer is interested in an item of evidence and fully expects to find it in the course of a search should not invalidate its seizure if the search is confined in area and duration by the terms of a warrant or a valid exception. Once the warrant is issued and the officer has a lawful right of access, no additional Fourth Amendment interest is furthered by requiring that the discovery of evidence be inadvertent.
United States v. Watson (1976)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrentless Arrests]
Postal inspector arrested Watson on the basis of a CI’s information and meeting with Watson. Arrest upheld on grounds of probable cause.
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrentless Arrests]
Atwater was arrested for driving her children in her pickup truck without a seatbelt. The court upheld the arrest, concluding that breach of the peace is not a requirement for a warrantless arrest.
Tennessee v. Garner (1985)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrentless Arrests – deadly force]
The use of deadly force to arrest a fleeing felon is sometimes unreasonable under the 4th Amendment. It is not better that all felony suspects die than that they escape. Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so. A police officer may not seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead. The Tennessee statute is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes the use of deadly force against such fleeing suspects. It is not unconstitutional on its face. Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, it is not unreasonable to use deadly force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe he has committed a crime involving serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape.
Scott v. Harris (2007)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrentless Arrests – deadly force]
Speeding motorist lead high speed chase, stopped when his car was flipped, resulting in him becoming a quadriplegic. It is appropriate when weighing the probability of injury of the suspect vs.the bystander to consider the number of lives at risk and their relative culpability. Multiple police cars, with blue lights flashing and sirens blaring, had been chasing respondent for nearly 10 miles, but he ignored their warning to stop. By contrast, those who might have been harmed were entirely innocent. The police action was reasonable.
Gerstein v. Pugh (1975)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrentless Arrests – Pretrial Confinement]
A policeman’s on-the-scene assessment of probable cause provides legal justification for arresting a person suspected of crime, and for a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps incident to arrest. Once the suspect is in custody, the reasons that justify the magistrate’s neutral judgment evaporate. There no longer is any danger that the suspect will escape or commit further crimes while the police submit their evidence to a magistrate. The consequences of prolonged detention may be more serious than the interference occasioned by arrest. Pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect’s job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family relationships. The Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint on liberty following arrest.
United States v. Robinson (1973)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Search Incident to Lawful Arrest]
Probable cause established that Robinson was driving without a license. Officer patted down Robinson and upon feeling an object in his breast pocket, removed it and found a crumpled up cigarette package, looked inside and found heroin. The justification to search incident to a lawful arrest rests quite as much on the need to disarm the suspect as it does on the need to preserve evidence on his person. The danger in transporting suspects to the police station provides the basis for treating all custodial arrests alike for search justifications. In the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is an exception to the warrant requirement and is reasonable under the 4th Amendment.
Whren v. United States (1996)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrentless Seizure – Automobile Stops]
The decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. Plainclothes officers in an unmarked car saw a truck make a sudden U-turn without signaling and speed off. When stopped the officers approached and saw two bags of what looked like cocaine. Their arrest and conviction were upheld.
Schmerber v. California (1966)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrentless Search – Blood Alcohol Tests]
BAC tests can be taken without a warrant because the destruction of evidence emergency and the facts of the case: the delay in getting to the hospital and time taken to investigate the scene.
Missouri v. McNeely (2013)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrentless Search – Blood Alcohol Tests]
Not a per se rule that BAC constitutes an emergency. Requires case-by-case assessment of exigency. In the cases where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the 4th mandates they do so. Some delay is to be expected, in the transport of the suspect to a medical facility and technology advances since Schmerber makes it easier to obtain a warrant.
Chimel v. California (1969)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrentless Search – Incident to Arrest]
Police armed with an arrest warrant, after being admitted into his residence, then searched the entire house. When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect escape. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. Same applies to the area immediately within arrestee’s control. There is no comparable justification for routinely searching rooms other than that in which an arrest occurs – or for that matter, searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself.
Maryland v. Buie (1990)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrentless Search – After the Defendant has been arrested in his home]
A protective sweep is permissible as an incident to the arrest the officers could, as a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest. Beyond that, there must be articuable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonable prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene. The protective sweep, aimed at protecting the arresting officers, is not a full search but may extend only to a cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may be found. May last no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and last no longer than is necessary to complete the arrest and depart the premises.
Washington v. Chrisman (1982)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrentless Search – Entry after arrest]
A warrantless entry of premises will be permissible incident to and following an arrest elsewhere in monitoring the arrested person’s movements. A college student was arrested for underage drinking, the officer followed him back to his room to get his id, and saw marijuana.
Arizona v. Hicks (1987)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrentless Search – Moving of Objects]
After police lawfully entered premises where a weapon was fired the officer noticed expensive stereo equipment in the squalid apartment. Suspecting stolen goods the officer moved the equipment to get their serial number. Held as an unreasonable search.
Kentucky v. King (2011)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrantless Search – Exigent Circumstances]
The exigent circumstances rule applies when the police do not gain entry to premises by means of an actual or threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment. When law enforcement officers who are not armed with a warrant knock on a door, they do no more than any private citizen might do. The occupant has no obligation to open the door or to speak. And even if an occupant chooses to open the door and speak with the officers, the occupant need not allow the officers to enter the premises and may refuse to answer any questions at any time. Occupants who choose not to stand on their constitutional rights but instead elect to attempt to destroy evidence have only themselves to blame for the warrantless exigent-circumstances search that may ensue. Police in chasing a suspect smelled marijuana coming out of a room they thought he went into. The police knocked and then heard the sound of people scrambling. They then entered and found drugs and cash. Search upheld.
Vale v. Louisiana (1970)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrentless Search – Arrest on the Street]
Officers had two warrant’s for Vale’s arrest. Police watching his home saw him approach a vehicle and thought they saw a narcotics sale. Vale was then arrested on his front steps. They then searched the house and found narcotics in the rear bedroom. The search of the house held unreasonable holding the arrest on the street did not provide its own exigent circumstance to justify a search of the house.
Payton v. New York (1980)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrentless Arrests – Exigent Circumstances]
One case involved the warrentless arrest of a murder suspect, thinking he was home they entered the apartment and saw a shell casing which was later used in trial. Another case involved the warrentless arrest of man found in a motel room, he was arrested and they searched his dresser finding narcotics. The Court reversed the admission of the evidence because there was no arrest warrant. Searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. However, weapons or contraband found in a public place may be seized without a warrant. The seizure of property in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity. In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.
Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrentless Arrests – Exigent Circumstances]
A witness saw Welsh drove into a field then fled to his home, where police arrested him in his bedroom. The court held an important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made. Hot-pursuit did not apply because there was no immediate or continuous pursuit of the suspect from the scene of the crime. The fact that the state did not make drunk driving a felony is the best evidence that exigent circumstances is not supported.
Steagald v. United States (1981)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrentless Arrests – Entry into a Third Person’s home]
Reversed conviction of Steagald when police entered his home looking for Lyons and saw drugs in plain view. Court reasoned the warrant did nothing to protect Steagald’s privacy interests. In the absence of exigent circumstances, police officer’s determination of probable cause is not reliable enough to justify an entry into a person’s home to arrest him without a warrant, or a search of a home for objects in the absence of a search warrant.
California v. Carney (1985)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrantless Searches – Motorhomes]
Police saw Carney and a youth enter a motorhome parked in lot. Upon officer’s request the youth knocked on the door and Carney exited, at which point the police saw marijuana. Carney’s arrest upheld because the court determined the motorhome was a vehicle and not a home. One of the exceptions to the warrant requirement is the automobile exception. Lowered expectation of privacy of a vehicle because of the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways.
California v. Acevedo (1991)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrantless Searches – Vehicles]
Suspect picked up a package the police knew contained marijuana. police saw Acevedo enter suspect’s apartment, leave with a bag appearing to contain some of the marijuana, place the bag in his trunk and drive off. The police stopped Acevedo, opened the trunk and bag and found the marijuana. The police had probable cause to believe that the paper bag in the automobile’s trunk contained marijuana. That probable cause now allows a warrantless search of the paper bag. The facts in the record reveal that the police did not have probable cause to believe that contraband was hidden in any other part of the automobile and a search of the entire vehicle would have been without probable cause and unreasonable.
Wyoming v. Houghton (1999)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrantless Searches – Passenger Belongings in a Vehicle]
After police stopped a vehicle for speeding, the driver admitted to have taken drugs. Two female passengers ordered out, police searched the vehicle and found a purse Houghton claimed as hers. They searched it and found drugs. Court upheld search reasoning when there is probable cause to search for contraband in a car, it is reasonable for police officers to examine packages and containers without a showing of individualized probable cause for each one. A passenger’s personal belongings, just like the driver’s, are attached to the car.
Illinois v. Andreas (1983)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrantless Searches – Previously Searched Container]
Agent found marijuana inside a container. The suspect picked it up and police later arrested him upon delivering it. The privacy interest in the contents of a container diminishes with respect to a container that law enforcement authorities have already lawfully opened and found to contain illicit drugs. No protected privacy interest remains in contraband in a container once government officers lawfully have opened that container and identified its contents as illegal.
Arizona v. Gant (2009)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrentless Searches – Vehicle Searches]
Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, handcuffed, and locked in the back of a patrol car. Police then searched his car and found cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat. Because Gant could not have accessed his car to retrieve weapons or evidence at the time of the search, the search-incident-to-arrest exception in Chimel and applied to vehicle searches in Belton did not justify the search. The Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when there arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search. Circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.
Maryland v. King (2013)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrantless Searches – DNA]
King was arrested for assault and upon being booked had his DNA taken through a buccal swab. When officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for a serious offense and they bring the suspect to the station to be detained, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Colorado v. Bertine (1987)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrantless Searches – Inventory]
A van was taken to an impound lot after driver arrested for drunk driving. Before the tow truck arrived an officer took an inventory of the contents. Drugs were found inside a backpack. Court upheld search as reasonable because inventory procedures serve to protect an owner’s property, to insure against claims of lost, stolen or vandalized property, and to guard the police from danger.
Terry v. Ohio (1968)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrentless Searches – On-the-street]
Officer saw suspect repeatedly stroll up and down a street, stopping to look inside a store window and joined by others. Suspected of casing the joint the officer stopped them, identified himself and asked for their names. They mumbled in return. The officer spun Terry around and patted his breast pocket, feeling a pistol. A frisk of Terry’s companion also uncovered a pistol. The evidence was upheld. Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has seized that person. Question is whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception and whether it was reasonably related in scope to that justification. The officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. In searching would a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances believe his safety or others were in danger.
United States v. Drayton (2002)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrantless Stop and Frisk Cases]
Police stopped and boarded a bus, Drayton conceded to a search of his bag and person from which cocaine was found taped between his thighs. Court held there had been no seizure. There was no application of force, no intimidating movement, no overwhelming show of force, no brandishing of weapons, no blocking of exits, no threat, no command, not even an authoritative tone of voice. Had the encounter occurred on the street it would be constitutional. Because many fellow passengers are present to witness officers’ conduct, a reasonable person may feel even more secure in his decision not to cooperate with police.
California v. Hodari (1991)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrantless Seizure]
Hodari fled upon seeing an approaching police car, pursued on foot, was seen tossing away what appeared to be small rock. Court upheld admission because Hodari was untouched by the officer at the time he discarded the cocaine. Fleeing does not constitute a seizure. The officer must have laid his hands or applied physical force to restrain movement to constitute a seizure.
United States v. Cortez (1981)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrantless Seizure – Grounds for Temporary Seizure]
The totality of the circumstances must be taken into account. The detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.
United States v. Hensley (1985)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrantless Seizure – Past Criminality]
If a flyer or bulletin has been issued on the basis of articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that the wanted person has committed an offense, then reliance on that flyer justifies a stop to check identification, to pose questions to the person, or to detain the person briefly while attempting to obtain further information. Applies regardless of whether criminal activity was in the past or ongoing.
Illinois v. Wardlow (2000)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrantless Seizure – High Crime Area]
An officer saw defendant look in the direction of the officers and then run away; defendant was stopped and frisked and found to be carrying a handgun. While presence in a high crime area standing alone is not sufficient to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion of criminal activity, it is a relevant characteristic in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation. Nervous evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.
Florida v. J.L. (2000)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrantless Seizure – Reasonable Suspicion]
An anonymous caller reported to police that a young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun was insufficient to support a finding of reasonable suspicion.
Florida v. Royer (1983)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrantless Seizure – Scope]
The seizure must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible. Movement of the suspect to another location is beyond the scope. Airline passenger asked to move to another room where he was asked to produce the key to his luggage. Held beyond the scope of the Terry stop and frisk.
United States v. Sharpe (1985)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrantless Seizure – Time limits]
Officers attempted to stop a car and a truck. The car pulled over but the truck continued on, eventually stopped. The time delay held reasonable. In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.
Illinois v. Caballes (2005)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrantless Seizure – Dog Sniff]
Defendant was stopped for speeding. Another trooper heard the radio transmission, traveled to the scene, and walked his drug dog around the car while defendant was in the patrol car awaiting a warning ticket. The dog alerted and a subsequent search revealed marijuana. The initial seizure of respondent was based on probable cause and lawful. A seizure that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution. A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission. The duration of the stop in this case was entirely justified by the traffic offense and the ordinary inquiries incident to such a stop. The dog sniff did not change that.
Ohio v. Robinette (1996)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrantless Search – Consent]
Defendant stopped for speeding issued a verbal warning then officer asked to search the car to which defendant consented. The search turned up marijuana. The court upheld search stating no warning is required before asking for consent.
United States v. Place (1983)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrantless Seizure – Temporary Seizure of Effects]
Federal agents stopped respondent, a suspected drug courier, seized his luggage and allowed respondent to go on his way. They took the bags to another airport where a trained narcotics dog reacted positively to one. The reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment of warrantless seizures of personal luggage from the custody of the owner on the basis of less than probable cause for the purpose of pursuing a limited course of investigation, short of opening the luggage, that would quickly confirm or dispel the authorities’ suspicion. The length of the detention of respondent’s luggage alone precludes a finding of reasonableness in the absence of probable cause.
Arizona v. Johnson
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrantless Search – Protective Search]
Three officers stopped a vehicle with three occupants after a license check revealed the registration was suspended. One of the officers asked the backseat passenger out of the car, frisked him, and found a gun. Search upheld. The Terry prerequisites for a frisk were a lawful stop and grounds for a frisk. In a traffic-stop setting the first Terry condition – a lawful investigatory stop – is met whenever it is lawful for police to detain an automobile and its occupants pending inquiry into a vehicular violation. The police need not have cause to believe any occupant of the vehicle is involved in criminal activity. To justify a patdown the police must harbor reasonable suspicion that the person subjected to the frisk is armed and dangerous.
Michigan v. Long (1983)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrantless Search – Vehicle Stop]
Two officers saw a car swerve into a ditch. During the stop they saw a large hunting knife on the floorboard. They then frisked Long and searched his vehicle and found marijuana. The court upheld the search reasoning our past cases indicate that protection of police and others can justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger, that roadside encounters between police and suspects are especially hazardous, and that danger may arise from the possible presence of weapons in the area surrounding a suspect. These principles support the conclusion that the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the officers in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrantless Search – Consent Searches]
A police officer stopped a car containing sex men for a burnt out headlight. After the driver could not produce id, the officer asked passenger Alcala, who claimed to be the driver’s brother, if he could search the car. He consented. Stolen checks were found and used against another passenger. Court held that when the subject of a search is not in custody and the state attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth Amendment requires that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied. Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances, and while the subjects’ knowledge of a right to refuse is taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge.
Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrantless Search – Third Party Consent Searches]
Gail Fischer, who showed signs of a beating, told police that she had been assaulted by Rodriguez. She traveled with the police to his apartment and unlocked the door. Inside they observed in plain view drugs. The officers arrested him and seized the drugs. The Fourth Amendment generally prohibits the warrantless entry of a person’s home, whether to make an arrest or to search for specific objects. The prohibition does not apply, however, to situations in which voluntary consent has been obtained, either from the individual whose property is searched, or from a third party who possesses common authority over the premises. Common authority rests on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes. The burden rests upon the state. As with other factual determinations bearing upon search and seizure, determination of consent to enter must be judged against an objective standard; would the facts available to the officer at the moment warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the premises? Yes – the search is valid.
Georgia v. Randolph (2006)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Warrantless Search – Defendant’s Refusal to Consent]
Police summoned to the Randolph residence were told by the wife that he was a drug user and there were items of drugs evidence in the house. Police asked his consent and he refused. Evidence held inadmissible. Cannot enter when one tenant refuses.
Hoffa v. United States (1966)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Confidential Informant]
Witness testified to incriminating statements made by Hoffa and King in his presence. The defense argued witness should have disclosed his role as a government informer in order for Hoffa to have consented. Court reasoned no interest legitimately protected by the Fourth Amendment was involved. defendant was not relying on the security of his hotel suite and there was no force involved. Witness was there by invitation. He was relying on his misplaced confidence that the witness would not reveal his wrongdoing. The Fourth Amendment does not protect a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.
United States v. White (1971)
[4th Amendment Right of Privacy – Confidential Informant]
Wearing a wire does not make an agent’s conduct into a search. There could be no constitutional difference.
Sorrells v. United States (1932)
[Criminal Law Defense – Entrapment]
Entrapment is a criminal law defense rather than a constitutional claim. An undercover agent befriended Sorrells based on their shared experience as soldiers. The agent asked repeatedly for liquor and Sorrells said no. Finally he consented, went out and bought some, then was arrested. The Court reversed the conviction holding the criminal design had originated with the undercover agent, who had implanted in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induced its commission in order that they may prosecute.
Sherman v. United States (1958)
[Criminal Law Defense – Entrapment – Inducement]
To be entitled to an entrapment defense, the defendant must show the government’s conduct induced the defendant to commit the crime. A government informer went to a doctor’s office to befriend defendant who was looking to be cured of his narcotics dependence. After repeatedly requesting narcotics to ease his pain defendant relented. The court reversed the conviction holding the function of law enforcement is the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals. Congress could not have intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into violations. However, the fact that government agents merely afford opportunities or facilities for the commission of the offense does not constitute entrapment. Entrapment occurs only when the criminal conduct was the product of the creative activity of law-enforcement officials. The government informer entices someone attempting to avoid narcotics not only into carrying out an illegal sale but also into returning to the habit of use. Thus the Government plays on the weaknesses of an innocent party and beguiles him into committing crimes which he otherwise would not have attempted.
United States v. Russell (1973)
[Criminal Law Defense – Entrapment – Inducement]
Undercover agent attempted to locate a laboratory where the illegal drug methampetamine was being manufactured. Shapiro met with Russell and pretended to represent an organization, offering them a scarce chemical in exchange for half of the product. The chemical was legal to possess but difficult to find. The defendants agreed and showed Shapiro their lab and demonstrated how to manufacture the drug. The Court upheld the conviction reasoning the contribution of the chemical to a criminal enterprise already underway is scarcely objectionable.
Jacobson v. United States (1992)
[Criminal Law Defense – Entrapment – Predisposition]
A farmer is solicited through the mail for over two years to buy some porn. The farmer finally consents. The court reversed the conviction holding the government did not prove that this predisposition was independent and not the product of the attention that the government had directed at petitioner. Further, he was acting within the law on his first order. Evidence of predisposition to do what once was lawful is not, by itself, sufficient to show predisposition to do what is now illegal, for there is a common understanding that most people obey the law even when they disapprove of it.
Entrapment – Predisposition
Jurisdictions that adopt the subjective approach to entrapment supplement the inducement test with an inquiry into the target’s predisposition. In the federal system, the defendant bears the initial burden of making a showing to the trial judge that the government induced the defendant to commit the crime. If the defendant makes that showing, the burden shifts to the government. The Government must then prove to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt either that in fact there was no inducement or that the defendant was predisposed to commit the offense. The jurors must acquit the defendant if they have reasonable doubt both that he was induced and that he was predisposed. If the jurors agree beyond a reasonable doubt either that the defendant was predisposed or that he was not induced the jury must reject the entrapment defense. If the jury acquits, the case is over; further proceedings are barred under the Double Jeopardy clause. If the jury convicts, the defendant may appeal the jury’s conclusion that he was not entrapped. Judicial review of the jury’s verdict is highly deferential. Only if he can persuade an appellate court that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt either that the defendant was predisposed or that he was not induced will the conviction be reversed.
Massiah v. United States (1964)
[6th Amendment Right to Counsel – Voluntary Confessions]
After being indicted Massiah retained a lawyer, pled not guilty, and released on bail. A codefendant invited him to discuss the case in his car and taped the conversation for the police. The conversation was held inadmissible because Massiah had been subjected to a completely extrajudicial police-orchestrated proceeding designed to obtain incriminating statements from him. The petitioner was denied the basic protections of the right to counsel when there was used against him his conversation elecited from him after he had been indicted and retained counsel.
Escobedo v. Illinois (1964)
[6th Amendment Right to Counsel –
Escobedo was taken into custody for questioning, made no statement and was released pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus obtained by his retained counsel. Eleven days later he was arrested again. The police blocked his attorney from seeing him. He requested his counsel, to which the police told him he’d be confronted by the codefendant to which he responded he didn’t fire the shots but the codefendant had. This statement held inadmissible because it was elicited through violation of the Sixth Amendment. Where the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied the assistance of counsel in violation of the sixth amendment and no statement elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used against him at a criminal trial.
Miranda v. Arizona (No. 759) (1966)
[Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination]
The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. In none of these cases did the officers undertake to afford appropriate safeguards at the outset of the interrogation to insure that the statements were truly the product of free choice. Such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. This atmosphere carries its own badge of intimidation. Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of free choice. No effective waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless specifically made after the warnings have been given. If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the Government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel.
Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010)
[5th Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination – Right to Remain Silent]
Defendant, a murder suspect, was read his Miranda rights. He declined to sign a form indicating that he understood his rights, but he did not explicitly assert his rights either. He remained largely silent during the questioning, only giving a few verbal responses such as yeah or I don’t know. About 2 hours and 45 minutes into the interrogation, a detective asked if he wanted god to forgive him for shooting the boy to which defendant responded yes. The court upheld the confession holding once the police have advised a custodial suspect of his Miranda rights, and the suspect has not asserted any of his rights, the police need not obtain a waiver of these rights before proceeding to interrogate him.
Duckworth v. Eagan (1989)
[5th Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination – Adequacy of Warnings]
Suspect denied any involvement in a murder. He agreed to go to police headquarters for further questioning. At the station the officer read you have a right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions, and to have him with you during questioning. You have the right to the advice and presence of a lawyer even if you cannot afford to hire one. We have no way giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court. The court upheld the warning as sufficient holding the inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably convey to a suspect his rights as required by Miranda.
Colorado v. Spring (1987)
[5th Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination – Awareness of Subject Matter]
A suspect’s awareness of all the possible subjects of questioning in advance of interrogation is not relevant to determining whether the suspect voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment privilege. Spring was arrested for stolen firearms, read his rights and signed a written waiver form. Several days later officers visited Spring, read him his rights and again signed waiver form. Spring confessed to a murder. Confession upheld because there is no constitutional requirement that the police keep defendant apprised of information.
Beckwith v. United States (1976)
[5th Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination – Custodial Interrogation]
Agents met with defendant in a private home where defendant occasionally stayed for questioning. Held to not be custodial for interrogation purposes and therefore did not require the reading of the full Miranda rights.
J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011)
[5th Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination – Suspect’s Age]
A child’s age properly informs the Miranda custody analysis. Defendant, a 13-year-old suspected of break-ins, was taken out of his classroom by a uniformed police officer and brought to a closed-door conference room. There he was met by two school administrators and a second police officer. He was given neither Miranda warnings nor the opportunity to speak to his legal guardian. Nor was he told he was free to leave the room. After 30 to 45 minutes of questioning he confessed. Whether a suspect is in custody is an objective inquiry. By limiting analysis to the objective circumstances of the interrogation, and asking how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would understand his freedom to terminate questioning and leave, the objective test avoids burdening police with the task of anticipating the idiosyncrasies of every individual suspect. A reasonable child subjected to police questioning will sometimes feel pressured to submit when a reasonable adult will feel free to go. So long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of the interview, or would have been objectively apparent the officer is to include age as part of the custody analysis.
Rhode Island v. Innis (1980)
[5th Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination – Interrogation]
Defendant arrested for suspicion of murder, read his rights, asked for an attorney and placed in patrol car. En route to the station police started a conversation amongst themselves stating how dangerous it was for a shotgun to be out where kids could find it. Court held this was not an interrogation. Interrogation as conceptualized in Miranda must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself. The Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. Any words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.
Arizona v. Mauro (1987)
[5th Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination – Custodial Interrogation]
Wife repeatedly requested to speak to husband in custody, against police warnings not to, spoke to husband with officer in room and tape recorder on table, not an interrogation. Court held there was no evidence that officers sent the wife in for the purpose of eliciting incriminating statements.
Illinois v. Perkins (1990)
[5th Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination – Jail Plant]
Miranda warnings are not required when the suspect is unaware that he is speaking to a law enforcement officer and gives a voluntary statement. While in a holding cell defendant made incriminating statements to undercover officers. Statement upheld as admissible because the essential ingredients of a police-dominated atmosphere and compulsion are not present when an incarcerated person speaks freely to someone that he believes to be a fellow inmate. Coercion is determined from the perspective of the suspect. When the suspect has no reason to think that the listeners have official power over him it should not be assumed that his words are motivated by the reaction he expects from his listeners.
Pennsylvania v. Muniz (1990)
[5th Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination – Testimonial Evidence]
Muniz was arrested for drunk driving, without advising him of his Miranda rights, the officer asked Muniz to perform three standard field sobriety tests. Muniz performed poorly and admitted to drinking. At booking he was asked his name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth and current age. Next the officer asked Do you know what the date was of your sixth birthday? to which Muniz responded no. The court excluded the sixth birthday question because the physical inability to articulate words in a clear manner due to the lack of muscular coordination of his tongue and mouth is not itself a testimonial component while the sixth birthday question is testimonial. Not only becuase of delivery but because of content; the trier of fact could infer from the answer that he did not know the proper date that his mental state was confused. The question is whether the incriminating inference of mental confusion is drawn from a testimonial act or from physical evidence.
New York v. Quarles (1984)
[5th Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination – Public Safety]
Quarles was apprehended in a supermarket for matching a rapist’s description. Four officers apprehended him, patted him down and found an empty shoulder holster. They asked where the gun was and Quarles told them. Court upheld admission as an exception to the Miranda warnings based on public safety. Overriding considerations of public safety justify the officer’s failure to provide Miranda warnings before asking where the gun was. The need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.
North Carolina v. Butler (1979)
[5th Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination – Implied Waiver]
Although a waiver is not established merely by showing that a defendant was given complete Miranda warnings and thereafter made an incriminating statement, this does not mean that a waiver of Miranda rights will never be recognized unless specifically made after the warnings are given. In some cases, waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated. Here, defendant was read his rights, he was asked if he understood them to which he said yes but that he wouldn’t sign the waiver form. He then made incriminating statements which were upheld by the Court because he showed that that knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights.
Connecticut v. Barrett (1987)
[5th Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination – Qualified Waiver]
Barrett, in custody for sexual assault, was thrice advised of his Miranda rights. On each occasion, after signing an acknowledgment that he had been informed of his rights, he indicated that he would not make a written statement but that he was willing to talk. His statement was upheld because he testified that he understood his Miranda rights.
Fare v. Michael C. (1979)
[5th Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination – Invocation of Rights]
A juvenile defendant was read his rights, taken into custody, and asked can I have my probation officer here? The court upheld his incriminating statements holding that the request to see a probation officer is not a per se invocation of Miranda rights.
Michigan v. Mosley (1975)
[5th Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination – Procedures when right to remain silent is asserted]
Defendant after being read his Miranda rights declined to talk but did not request a lawyer. The detective promptly ceased questioning. He was then taken to a cell block, after 2 hours he was brought in for questioning about an unrelated murder. He was again advised of his rights, this time he waived them and made an incriminating statement. The court held the statement admissible holding the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends on whether his right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored. The questioning had stopped and he was read his rights and asked about a different crime.
Edwards v. Arizona (1981)
[5th Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination – Procedure when right to counsel invoked]
Once a suspect has invoked his right to counsel he may not be subjected to further interrogation until counsel has been made available to him unless he himself initiates further communication. Edwards, arrested for burglary, robbery and murder, was taken to the police station. He waived his rights and agreed to talk then later asserted his right to counsel. Questioning ceased and Edwards was taken to jail. The next morning, two detectives came to the jail, met with Edwards and again read his rights. He then made incriminating statements. Additional safeguards for waiver are necessary when the accused asks for counsel; when an in-custody suspect does assert this right a valid waiver of it cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further interrogation.
Howes v. Fields (2012)
[5th Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination – Custodial Interrogation – Prisoner Rights]
Fields, a prisoner, was taken from his cell to a conference room where he was questioned for five to seven hours. At no time was he given Miranda warnings. However, he was told more than once he was free to return to his cell. Held not to be in custody for Miranda purposes.
Maryland v. Shatzer (2010)
[5th Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination – Custodial Interrogation – Break in Custody]
Shatzer, a prisoner, was repeatedly questioned over a two year period of time for an unrelated crime. Held 14 days is a sufficient break to justify resumption of questioning.
Oregon v. Bradshaw (1983)
[5th Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination – Invoking Right to Counsel – Initiating Further Communication]
Bradshaw arrested for furnishing alcohol to a minor agreed to talk to an officer about the fatal crash, then expressed a desire to talk to a lawyer. The officers immediately terminated the conversation. A few minutes later Bradshaw asked what was going to happen. Held sufficient to justify initiation of communication to waive right to counsel.
Davis v. United States (1994)
[5th Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination – Invoking Right to Counsel]
Davis, suspected of murder, was questioned, about an hour into the interview he stated maybe he should talk to a lawyer. To invoke the Edwards rule the suspect must unambiguously request counsel.
Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010)
[5th Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination – Invoking Right to Remain Silent]
A suspect must invoke his right to remain silent unambiguously. Thompkins did not say that he wanted to remain silent or that he did not want to talk. Had he made either of these statements, he would have invoked his right to cut off questioning. The waiver inquiry must be voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. And made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision. Here, Thompkins showed his understanding by reading the waiver. A suspect who has received and understood the Miranda warnings, and has not invoked his Miranda rights, waives the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced statement to the police.
Montejo v. Louisiana (2009)
[6th Amendment Right to Counsel – Invocation of Right to Counsel]
Montejo, a murder suspect, waived his Miranda rights and was interrogated. Three days later he was brought before a judge for a preliminary hearing where he was appointed counsel. Later that day he was escorted to locate the gun and read his rights. During the trip he wrote an apology letter to the widow. Remanded to be determined under the Edwards standard. Under Miranda any suspect subject to custodial interrogation has the right to have a lawyer present if he so requests and to be advised of that right. Under Edwards once such a defendant has invoked his right to have counsel present interrogation must stop.
McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991)
[6th Amendment Right to Counsel – Invocation at hearing does not protect against unrelated interrogation]
A suspect asserted his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by his appearance with counsel at a bail hearing. His appearance at the bail hearing for the armed robbery did not constitute an invocation of the Miranda-Edwards interest. The court held the Sixth Amendment right to counsel provides less protection than does the Miranda-Edwards-Roberson rule. Unlike the latter, which when invoked, protects one from police-initiated interrogation with respect to any crime, the Sixth Amendment is offense-specific. The police can initiate questioning about crimes other than the one with which he was charged.
Moran v. Burbine (1986)
[6th Amendment Right to Counsel – Third Party Invocation of Right to Counsel]
After being informed of his rights and signing waivers Burbine confessed to a murder. At no point did he request an attorney. However, his sister had retained an attorney and the attorney had contacted the police. Although highly inappropriate, even deliberate deception of an attorney could not possibly affect a suspect’s decision to waive his Miranda rights.
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon (2006)
[Consular Post Vienna Convention Requirements]
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention provides that if a national of one country is detained by authorities in another, and the detainee so requests, the authorities must promptly inform the consular post. The convention also provides that the authorities should promptly adivise the detainee of this right. The court held violation of the Vienna Convention did not furnish a basis for suppressing incriminating statements.
Dickerson v. United States (2000)
[5th Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination – Congressional Statute]
Miranda, being a constitutional decision, cannot be overruled by an act of Congress. Miranda and its progeny govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation. Suspect was not read his rights, government attempted to argue that pursuant to Sec 3501 they were not required. Court rejected the argument holding Congress may not legislatively supersede decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution.
Salinas v. Texas (2013)
[5th Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination – Right to Remain Silent if not in Custody]
The police asked defendant to come to the police station to clear himself. When he arrived he was not in custody, he was free to leave at that time. As a result he was not read his Miranda rights. His response to questions was used at trial against him. The privilege against self-incrimination is an exception to the general rule that the Government has the right to everyone’s testimony. To prevent the privilege from shielding information not properly within its scope. a witness who desires the protection must claim it. That requirement ensures that the Government is put on notice when a witness intends to rely on the privilege so that it may either argue or cure it.
Chavez v. Martinez (2003)
[5th Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination – 14th Amendment Due Process]
During an altercation with police Martinez was shot, leaving him partially blind and paralyzed. Chavez arrived on the scene and accompanied Martinez to the hospital where he questioned him while receiving treatment. Martinez sued for violation of his 5th and 14th Amendment rights. Court held there was no violation. The 5th requires a criminal case and here Martinez was never charged. Due process not violated because Chavez did not act with the intent to cause harm or interfered with medical treatment. Moreover, the need to investigate whether there had been police misconduct constituted a justifiable government interest given the risk Martinez may have died.
Oregon v. Elstad (1985)
[5th Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination – Evidence derived from Violation of]
The Court declined to apply the poisoned fruit doctrine to a second confession following a confession obtained without giving defendant the Miranda warnings. When police questioned defendant in his own home he was not read his rights and confessed. He was then taken to the station and read his rights. He waived his rights and gave the police a statement. The first statement held inadmissible. The second statement the court held admissible because it was not tainted fruit.
United States v. Patane (2004)
[5th Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination – Evidence derived from Violation of]
Defendant was arrested outside his home and handcuffed. When read his rights he interrupted and the rights stopped. State conceded that was a violation. The defendant stated where his gun could be found, the police retrieved it and admitted into evidence. Upheld because the admission into evidence of the physical fruit of a voluntary statement does not implicate the self-incrimination clause. Because he Miranda rule necessarily sweep beyond the actual protections of the self-incrimination clause, any further extension of these rules must be justified by its necessity for the protection of the actual right against compelled self-incrimination. Potential violations occur only upon the admission of unwarned statements into evidence at trial. And, at that point, the exclusion of unwarned statements is a complete and sufficient remedy for any Miranda violations.
Missouri v. Seibert (2004)
[5th Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination – Evidence derived from Violation of]
Police protocol for custodial interrogation that calls for no warnings of the rights to silence and counsel until a confession is produced held unconstitutional. After suspect gave incriminating statement, given 20 min break, then read her rights and requestioned. The object of the protocol was to render Miranda warnings ineffective. Distinguished from Elstad because the completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first round of interrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and setting of the first and second, the continuity of police personnel, and the degree to which the interrogator’s questions treated the second round as continuous with the first.
Arizona v. Fulminante (1991)
[5th Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination – 14th Amendment Due Process]
A paid informer repeatedly asked defendant about killing his stepdaughter which he denied. After mentioning that he could protect the defendant from the other inmates defendant confessed. Court held inadmissible because it violated due process as a coerced confession. In applying the totality of the circumstances test to determine that the confession was coerced the court looked at the harm he was in and the use of the rough treatments by the paid informer.
Colorado v. Connely (1986)
[5th Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination – 14th Amendment Due Process]
Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not voluntary within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. Absent police conduct causally related to the confession, there is simply no basis for concludting that any state action has deprived a criminal defendant of due process. Defendant, mentally ill, flew to Colorado, approached an officer and confessed to a murder. His confession was upheld.
Brewer v. Williams (Williams I) (1977)
[6th Amendment Right to Counsel – After Proceedings Initiated]
Williams, an escaped mental patient, killed a girl. Upon surrendering to the police they booked him and read him his rights. They then transported him to Davenport and along the way commenced conversation with him regarding the inability to give the girl a proper burial. The held the admission inadmissible in violation of the constitutional right to counsel. The right to counsel means that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated. Here there was an arrest for his arrest, he had been arraigned on that warrant and he had been committed to jail. Once adversary proceedings have commenced he has a right to legal representation when the government interrogates him.
Patterson v. Illinois (1988)
[6th Amendment Right to Counsel – Valid Waiver]
Patterson, a member of a street gang, was arrested for murder. Read his rights, agreed to answer questions but denied knowing anything. Two days later he was indicted for murder. Upon being transferred he made incriminating statements. Upheld because he waived his rights by signing the waivers after being read his rights. As a general matter, an accused who is admonished with the Miranda warnings has been sufficiently apprised of the nature of his Sixth Amendment rights, and of the consequences of abandoning those rights, so that his waiver will be considered a knowing and intelligent one.
Maine v. Moulton (1985)
[6th Amendment Right to Counsel – Exclusionary Rule]
If statements are made after the right to counsel attaches for a purpose unrelated to the charge, then that statement cannot be used against the defendant in a criminal trial.
Texas v. Cobb (2001)
[6th Amendment Right to Counsel – All other Offenses]
When the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, it does encompass offenses that, even if not charged, would be considered the same offense under the Blockburger test. Where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test is whether there are two offenses or only one, whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.

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